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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
Noah Duguid, on behalf of himself and all 
others similarly situated, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
 vs. 
 
Facebook, Inc., 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
Case No.:  _________________ 
 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR    
DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF THE 
TELEPHONE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, 
ET SEQ. 
 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
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 For his Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff, Noah Duguid, by and through his 
undersigned counsel, pleading on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated, states as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Plaintiff, Noah Duguid (“Plaintiff”), brings this class action for damages 
resulting from the illegal actions of Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook” or “Defendant”).  
Defendant negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully sent unauthorized automated text 
messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (the “TCPA”). 
2. Wireless spam is a growing problem in the United States.  In April 2012, 
the Pew Research Center found that 69% of texters reported receiving unwanted spam 
text messages, while 25% reported receiving spam texts weekly.  
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited 
November 6, 2014); see also Nicole Perlroth, Spam Invades a Last Refuge, the 
Cellphone, N.Y.Times, April 8, 2012, at A1 (“In the United States, consumers received 
roughly 4.5 billion spam texts [in 2011], more than double the 2.2 billion received in 
2009 . . . .”). 
3. Facebook operates an online social network.  Facebook’s market value 
reportedly exceeds $200 billion.  Facebook had 864 million daily active users and 1.35 
billion monthly active users as of September, 2014. 
4. Consumers often share private information on Facebook.  As an “extra 
security feature,” Facebook can send “login notifications” to alert users when their 
account is accessed from a new device (computer, smart-phone, tablet, etc.).  Facebook 
describes the login notifications as follows: “When you turn on login notifications, 
we’ll send you an alert each time someone logs into your account from a new place.”  
See Exhibit A.  Login notifications can be sent to mobile telephones. See Exhibit A. 
5.  Login notifications in the form of text messages are often sent to the 
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cellular telephones of people who have not authorized Facebook to contact them on 
their cell phones, who have requested that the notifications stop, and, still more 
egregious, to the phones of people who do not use Facebook whatsoever.   These text 
messages state: “Your Facebook account was accessed from [internet browser] at 
[time].  Log in for more info.”  Consumers can receive these unwanted text messages 
several times a day. 
6. Facebook provides instructions on its website to deactivate the login 
notification feature.  However, these instructions only address stopping the messages 
by changing a Facebook user’s account settings.  See Exhibit B.  Facebook offers no 
solution for those receiving the messages despite having no Facebook account. 
7. Online blogs indicate that consumers can also respond “off” to 
Facebook’s text messages to get them to stop.  See Exhibit C.  Indeed, Facebook 
responds to such texts with messages stating: “Facebook texts are now off.  Reply on 
to turn back on.”  See Exhibits C & D.  However, Facebook often disregards 
consumers’ requests to stop the login notifications.  Rather than cease as instructed, 
Facebook continues to knowingly hound consumers with unwanted and unauthorized 
text messages.  See Exhibits C & D.  As one Facebook user complained, “I have tried 
texting ‘Off’ ‘OFF’ ‘off” ‘STOP’ ‘Stop’.  NONE of them have stopped the text 
messages.  If I get one more text message from Facebook I will delete the whole 
account.”  Exhibit C. 
8. Servicing over a billion Facebook accounts worldwide, Facebook’s 
automated systems are powerful and, when used improperly, capable of extreme 
invasions into the privacy of American consumers.  See Exhibit C (consumer 
complaining of receiving text messages from Facebook “at all hours of the night”). 
Facebook operates a sloppy system and in doing so shows complete disregard for the 
privacy of consumers. 
9. Plaintiff is such a consumer and he seeks relief for himself and all others 
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similarly situated from Facebook’s unlawful behavior. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
10. This Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Serv., LLC, 132 S.Ct. 740, 751-53 (2012). 
11. Jurisdiction in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), 
as Plaintiff seeks at least $500 in damages for each violation of the TCPA, which when 
aggregated among a proposed class numbering more than a thousand members, 
exceeds the $5,000,000.00 threshold for federal court jurisdiction.  Plaintiff also 
alleges a national class which will result in at least one class member residing in a 
different state.   
12. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because 
Defendant resides in this District and because a substantial part of the events giving 
rise to the claim occurred in this District. 
PARTIES 
13. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an adult individual 
residing in Stevensville, Montana, and is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 
14. Facebook is a California business entity with an address of 1601 Willow 
Road, Menlo Park, California 94025, and is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 
153(39). 
THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 
15. The TCPA regulates, among other things, the use of automated telephone 
dialing systems (“ATDS”). 
16. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) defines an ATDS as equipment having the 
capacity–  
(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or 
sequential number generator; and   
(B) to dial such numbers. 
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17. Specifically, 47 U.S.C. § 227(1)(A)(iii) prohibits any call using an ATDS 
to a cellular phone without prior express consent by the person being called, unless the 
call is for emergency purposes. 
18. The FCC has clarified that text messages qualify as “calls” under the 
TCPA: 
We affirm that under the TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an 
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded message to 
any wireless telephone number.  Both the statute and our rules prohibit these 
calls, with limited exceptions, “to any telephone number assigned to a paging 
service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other 
common carrier service, or any service for which the party is charged.”  This 
encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for 
example, short message service (SMS) calls, provided the call is made to a 
telephone number assigned to such service. 
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (July 3, 2003); see Satterfield v. 
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2009). 
19. “Prior express written consent” means that there must be a written 
agreement, signed by the person receiving the call or text, with a “clear and 
conspicuous disclosure” that specifically authorizes the seller to send telemarketing 
communications using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or 
prerecorded voice. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 
ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS 
20. On or around January 25, 2014, Facebook began placing text messages to 
Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, 406-xxx-7935. 
21. Facebook placed the text messages from number 326-65 (spelling 
FBOOK), an abbreviated telephone number known as an SMS short code licensed and 
operated by Defendant or one of its agents on its behalf.  
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22. Facebook placed repeated text messages to the Plaintiff.  A true and 
correct copy of several of the messages received by Plaintiff are produced below: 
 
 
23. Facebook obtained Plaintiff’s telephone number through unknown means.  
24. At no time did Plaintiff ever provide his cellular telephone number to 
Facebook.  
25. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with 
Facebook. 
26. At no time did Plaintiff provide Facebook prior written consent for it to 
send text messages to his cellular phone.  
27. Further, on or around April 20, 2014, Plaintiff sent Facebook a detailed 
email complaining of the unauthorized text messages to his cell phone and requesting 
that the text messages cease.  In response, Facebook sent Plaintiff an automated email 
directing Plaintiff to log on to the Facebook website to report problematic “content.”  
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Plaintiff responded to the email by re-explaining his issue and stating: “A human needs 
to read this email and take action.  Thank you!”  In response, Facebook sent the same 
automated email as received in response to the first email.  See Exhibit E. 
28. Still further, on October 18, 2014, Plaintiff responded to a text messages 
from Facebook with the word “off.”  Facebook responded: “Facebook texts are now 
off.  Reply on to turn them back on.”  However, the very same day, Facebook sent 
Plaintiff another text message.  Plaintiff once again responded “off” and “all off.”  
Again, Facebook responded:  “Facebook texts are now off.  Reply on to turn them back 
on.”  Again, still in the same day, Facebook sent Plaintiff another text message.  See 
Exhibit D. 
29. The text messages sent to Plaintiff’s cellular phone were made with an 
ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).  
30. The ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be 
called, using a random or sequential number generator.  
31. The telephone number messaged by Facebook was assigned to a cellular 
telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs charges for incoming messages pursuant to 
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 
32. The messages from Facebook to Plaintiff were not placed for “emergency 
purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
A. The Class 
33. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on 
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 
34. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes: 
Class 1: All persons within the United States who did not provide 
their cellular telephone number to Defendant and who received 
one or more text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant to said 
person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any 
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automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to 
the filing of the Complaint. 
Class 2: All persons within the United States who, after notifying 
Defendant that it no longer wished to receive text messages and 
receiving a confirmation from Defendant to that effect, received 
one or more text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant to said 
person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any 
automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to 
the filing of the Complaint. 
35. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. 
Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the class 
members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be 
certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 
36. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of 
economic injury on behalf of the Classes, and it expressly is not intended to request 
any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right 
to modify or expand the Class definitions to seek recovery on behalf of additional 
persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery.  
B. Numerosity 
37. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent text messages to cellular 
telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States 
without their prior express consent.  The members of the Classes, therefore, are 
believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 
38. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this 
time and can only be ascertained through discovery.  Identification of the Class 
members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records.  
C. Common Questions of Law and Fact  
39. There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members.  These 
questions include: 
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a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff 
and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; 
b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained 
prior express consent to send each message; 
c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; 
d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such 
damages; and 
e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the 
future. 
40. The common questions in this case are capable of having common 
answers.  If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely sends automated text messages 
to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services without prior express 
consent is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable 
of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.  
D. Typicality  
41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they 
are all based on the same factual and legal theories. 
E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members  
42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes and 
has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving 
unlawful business practices.  Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which 
might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 
F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable  
43. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of this controversy.  The interest of Class members in individually controlling the 
prosecutions of separate claims against Facebook is small because it is not 
economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. 
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44. Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties.  
Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions.  These cases include, but are not 
limited to: Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski 
v. Med1 Online, LLC, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. 
Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European 
Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012). 
COUNT I 
Violations of the Telephone  
Consumer Protection Act,  
47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 
45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and 
incorporates them herein by reference. 
46. Defendant sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers 
belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express 
consent. 
47. Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a violation 
of the TCPA. 
48. Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory 
damages for each message sent in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(3)(B). 
49. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive 
relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 
COUNT II 
Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the  
Telephone Consumer Protection Act,  
47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 
50. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and 
incorporates them herein by reference. 
51. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully sent multiple automated text 
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messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the 
Classes without their prior express consent. 
52. Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a knowing 
and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 
53. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 
Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for 
each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(3)(C). 
54. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive 
relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court grant Plaintiff and the Classes 
the following relief against Defendant as follows: 
1. Injunctive relief prohibiting such violations of the TCPA by Defendant 
in the future; 
2. Statutory damages of $500.00 for each and every call in violation of the 
TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B); 
3. Treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call in violation 
of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C); 
4. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs to counsel for Plaintiff and the 
Classes; and 
5. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
 
TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED ON ALL COUNTS 
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DATED:  March 3, 2015  Respectfully submitted, 
 By:     /s/   Trinette Kent                 
 Trinette Kent, Esq. (Bar No. 222020) 
 Lemberg Law, LLC 
 Attorney for Plaintiff, Noah Duguid 
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